Engineering Eurasia
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Engineering Eurasia
Vladimir Putin and the Weaponization of History
To Begin,
In the past two decades, the Russian Federation has undergone an ideological and geopolitical transformation unimaginable to many at the beginning of the 21st century. Russian President Vladimir Putin has consolidated power and crafted policy to restructure Russian society and foreign policy. Eurasianist principles, advanced by the enigmatic political scientist Alexandr Dugin, have become central to the Kremlin’s doctrine, providing a historical grounding and an outlet for long-standing Russian ideas about exceptionalism, religiosity, and imperialism. Putin has transformed these theories into policy decisions and propaganda with the aim of forging Russia into a nationalistic, conservative, and anti-Western great power.
On Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin
Leningrad is a city that bears the scars of history. The Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union saw the former imperial capital subjected to nearly four years of brutal siege. Many perished, and many more were injured and severely malnourished by the time of liberation. Among the dead was Viktor Putin, whose parents would later give birth to Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin. It was in this environment, a city that had seen, and outlasted, the worst sides of human nature in one of the most destructive conflicts in human history that Putin was raised. Those who had experienced the horrors of the siege began to embody ideals of survivalism and resilience even in peacetime. These ideals were instilled in Putin, a man who constantly plans to avoid the worst outcomes in all situations.
Yet, for all that Putin’s planning mentality brought him, he found himself in situations where he was helpless. Most especially, Putin was stationed in Dresden as a KGB member when, in 1989, there was an attack on the agency as East Germany was breaking free from the Iron Curtain. The now-deceased former General Secretary of the Communist Party, Yuri Andropov, witnessed similar events during the 1956 Hungarian uprising. Andropov, one of Putin’s most influential mentors, and Putin himself, both grew to hold democracy and populist mobilization in disdain after these events. In spite of his background not being rooted in the Moscow elite, Putin was able to use his charms and manipulation skills to eventually become head of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) which succeeded the KGB.
Putin feels deeply tied to his country, saying he is “always guided by the interests of the Russian people and Russian state.” Moving from the mayor of St. Petersburg to being Boris Yeltsin’s number two, Putin began to view himself as a Chekist, a powerful leader who decides Russia’s political and economic strategy. These feelings of grandeur were exemplified by a 1999 semi-campaign platform for his Presidential run, claiming that Russia was in the greatest crisis in its history, and all of the nation’s resources must be put towards the goal of reuniting the nation. What could be interpreted as political fear-mongering and exaggerations are actually representations of Putin’s deep-seated beliefs about his role in saving Russia. These views set the stage for Putin’s later policy choices and ideological stances. Vladimir Putin has continually leveraged Eurasian ideology and historical narratives to foster a sense of historical continuity for his strategic policy goals. This not only furthers his aims of forging Russia into a nationalistic, conservative, and anti-Western great power but also engineering a state with distinctively Eurasian societal and political traditions. To understand these narratives and decisions, the ideological foundations of Eurasianism must first be examined.
Foundations of Eurasianism
To understand Russian culture, one must acquaint themselves with the historical nature of Russian suffering. Lev Gumilev, a prominent Russian historian, coined the term Passionarnost, describing the idea of the suffering of the individual for the betterment of the nation. As he put it, the term represents a “moving forward and embracing change.” It was Russia’s victory over Germany in WW2 that validated Gumilev’s theory that feats of sacrifice were what propelled societies to victory, not superior technology. Gumilev seeks to assign Russia’s victory not simply to material conditions, resources, or superior organization. Rather, his view is that the victory resulted from innate cultural characteristics. In a way, he sought to tease out a sort of civilizational distinction which was developed across generations and eras.
These observations led Gumilev to construct an ideological framework, which he called “Eurasianism.” The essential idea of Eurasianism espouses that it is all Eurasian peoples that share a common consciousness. Implicit within this construction is this historical lineage of innate beliefs and cultural attitudes. The Eurasian ideology links modern conceptions of Russia to a distinctive historical lineage, with its own common set of values. Gumilev’s analysis of historical Russian-ness led him to envision Russia as being in the middle of a 1,200-year lifespan. In the words of the author Charles Clover, Eurasianist principles function as “ciphers for a lost Russia.” Not only do Gumilev’s theories link the present to the past, but also outline a path towards a common and unified civilizational future.
Historical narratives have formed the basis of Eurasianism, being manifest in all tenets of the ideology. One such tenet of Eurasianism surrounds the geographical expanse of Russia, which masquerades as a larger conception of Eurasia. There exists a longstanding Russian belief that they have a historical right to control former imperial lands across Europe and Central Asia. In a geographic sense, this position is somewhat justified. Russia has found itself at the center of numerous historical conquests and invasions. One can draw a common thread between the Mongol invasions in 1223 to the Polish invasion in 1609 to Napoleon’s rampage in 1812. Such feelings have manifested themselves in more practical ways, such as intense scrutiny of outsiders. Gumilev took these feelings and hardened them into a concrete system of beliefs. His conception of a common Eurasia relies on Russia’s historical links to societies of both Central Europe and Central Asia. More specifically, however, Gumilev admired the more horde-like societies of the Scythians, Huns, Turks, and Mongols, seeing Russia as the modern extension of their innate cultural characteristics.
However, interpreting this linkage at face value ignores the nuance of Gumilev’s ideology. Instead of being the modern version of the Mongol Empire, Gumilev instead sought to distance Russia from Europe in a cultural and historical sense, emphasizing the Mongol personification of more naturalistic and primal tendencies in popular culture to emphasize the uniqueness of Russia. Gumilev, alongside many prominent Russian philosophers, began to almost mythologize this mystical and eternal idea of Russia. Historical lineages and affinities are manipulated to dignify and purify Russian heritage. Here, Russian-ness becomes detached from the West, forging a new and more distinctive cultural consciousness. This concept of Russian exceptionalism only began to grow in the years that followed, most notably in the works of Alexander Dugin.
Alexander Dugin, the Herald of Eurasia
Alexander Dugin is a man of many titles: philosopher, analyst, activist, and even leader of two political parties. Yet, Dugin’s most influential role may be as the author of the 1997 book Foundations of Geopolitics. The book, which wrapped many of Dugin’s own beliefs into the broader Eurasian ideology, became a huge success within the country. He argues for an autocratic regime where the population is ascetic and valor-obsessed, while those who exist outside the Russian (Eurasian) sphere are subordinate in status. These views distinctly parallel the works of earlier philosophers and political thinkers, purporting to describe a unique identity inherent to Russia. In a way, Dugin resurrects the so-called “Russian Idea.”
Central to Dugin’s ideology is the desire to create a sort of multinational, multi-ethnic, yet distinctly Russian, empire of Eurasia. Dugin, like Gumilev, is purporting that there does indeed exist a Eurasian civilization that has its own cultural and ideological contours. Yet, Dugin harkens back not only to these perceived cultural roots but also plays upon nostalgia for the Russian empire of yore. This language plays to the ego-wounded culture of post-Soviet Russia, claiming that rebuilding this former empire will provide us with the tools to become whole and prosperous again. Though, implicit within this doctrine is the subjugation of neighboring cultures and domestic minorities.
One of Dugin’s greatest ideological adversaries is Sir Halford Mackinder. Mackinder, a long-dead British academic, presented to the Royal Geographical Society in 1904 a lecture titled “The Geographical Pivot of History.” He purported that Russia is Britain’s greatest geopolitical opponent, shielded by a land fortress in its Eurasian “Heartland,” contrasting this with Britain’s historically immense naval power. Russia would naturally seek access to the sea, while, he argued, more naval countries like Britain would inevitably seek the land’s resources. Dugin took these ideas and integrated them into his version of Eurasianism, drawing a clear distinction between the wants of the East and the West. It was in this way that the ideology began to find its footing in a more geopolitical context. Land subconsciously became the central focus of Dugin’s ideology.
From Fringe Ideology to Kremlin Doctrine
Boris Yeltsin’s democratic and egalitarian optimism had all but evaporated by the end of his time. Industrial and agricultural output plummeted, and people were lost after a post-Soviet national identity never truly took hold. This apathetic post-Soviet environment must have seemed a perfect place to initiate the second phase of this revolution. In fact, many prominent Eurasianists saw the Bolshevik revolution as a half-complete “Eurasian revolution.” Some even felt especially optimistic about the prospect of change in this desolate cultural environment. As the former General Nikolai Klokotov stated in 1993 that “historical experience gives us hope” in times of crisis. Of particular note is that Klokotov is alleged to have helped Dugin write Foundations of Geopolitics, though this has not been confirmed. Irrespective of this, it is clear that Klokotov’s mentioning of historical experience suggests that he, and many others, believe that Eurasianism is the true unifying historical force in modern Russia.
The lobbying of prominent Eurasianists induced Yeltsin to co-opt more nationalistic policies, such as reviving the Commonwealth of Independent States and settling a treaty of union with neighboring Belarus. These actions demonstrate that Eurasianist, and other similarly nationalistic and expansionist-oriented ideologies, began to permeate the Kremlin even before the time of Putin’s leadership.
Piecing together the direct path from Dugin’s book into Putin’s government has been difficult for Western scholars to chart. A major characteristic of Putin’s government is its inclusion of many members of siloviki (security forces). Dugin’s book had an immediate appeal to members of the siloviki, as it portrayed the great conflict of the age as not an economic one, but a civilizational one. Rooting his ideology in geopolitical and conflict-based terms signaled to the siloviki the continuing utility and relevance of military/security-based skill sets. It seems only natural, then, that as Putin surrounded himself with these Eurasian mouthpieces he would begin to make note of the previously obscure ideology.
Vladislav Surkov, a fixture of Putin’s early presidency and government official, has sometimes been called “Putin’s Rasputin.” It was Surkov who began to crystallize the idea of “sovereign democracy,” emphasizing Russia’s position as an alternative to Western liberalism. Surkov also began to question the sovereignty of neighboring countries, like Ukraine, and advocated for a more centralized state. His ideological tendencies clearly echo Dugin’s earlier writings, postulating that Russia exists as a unique and exceptional entity. Eurasianist principles had begun, even in the early days of Putin’s rule, to circulate around the Russian President. Surkov’s early-2000s manifesto titled “Nationalization of the Future” argues that Russia must abandon its Western trajectory, instead fostering “a new society, a new economy, a new army, [and] a new faith.” Though Surkov uses the word “new” to describe his idealized Russia, the ideas he purports are deeply grounded in Russian history. It is at this point that these ideological machinations clearly begin to cross paths with the President himself.
Putin, Student of Geopolitical History?
Putin’s first term as President was initially marked by a renewal of national pride and identity. This was parallel to Putin’s overtones to the international community, describing Russia as a European nation. The global introspection following 9/11 only further shifted Putin’s outward alignment more towards the American/European camp. Domestically, too, Putin largely focused on building a free market economy and implementing tax reforms. Yet, these were simply ways to pacify the population. Deep down, Putin was undergoing an ideological realignment. His personality and beliefs, while strong, lacked doctrinal conviction and grounding.
Putin has long admired the former Russian Prime Minister Pyotr Stolypin, and one can see parallels in their policy-making beyond simply authoritarian tendencies. Specifically, Putin is emblematic of Stolypin’s historical attempts at nonrevolutionary transformation of the state. Both men have long been unconcerned with the day-to-day and immediate realities of governance. That is not to say, however, that either man is left in their own little bubbles, unable to take strong and effective positions. In 1999, before Putin’s ascendancy to President, he spearheaded the successful invasion of Chechnya, cementing his leadership skills in the eyes of the public and replacing Yeltsin. This invasion played upon themes of history in a number of important ways. In the short term history, Putin capped and solidified Yeltsin’s failed attempts to quell Chechen separatism. Thus, the utility was realized in Putin’s establishment as a strong successor to Yeltsin. Yet, there exists a deeper historical strain in Putin’s actions. He was reestablishing Russia’s position as an offensive player in the geopolitical game. The external actions of the Soviet Union, Russian Empire, and even Kievan Rus were being revitalized, with Putin at the helm.
To political outsiders, Putin’s strategic invasion may have simply seemed like a blip on the global sonar. Again, he was indeed outwardly warming up to the Western world. Yet, this was all a facade. As early as November of 2000, Putin was expressing sympathies to more nationalistic ideologies, stating that “Russia has always perceived of itself as a Eurasian country.” Using the word Eurasian to describe Russia directly flies in the face of his more European overtures. Further, he is directly parroting the language of earlier philosophers and thinkers, demonstrating their influence over Putin’s early foreign policy choices. As stated in Putin’s 2008 foreign policy doctrine, “global competition is acquiring a civilization dimension.” Here, he transcends the traditional logic of states competing with other states in more economic or practical terms. Instead, he suggests that we are entering an age where values and historical developments of culture are what shape the global community. This allows Putin to ignore, or at least discredit, more tacit political agreements and rigid national borders. Putin’s 2011 suggestion of the creation of a “Eurasian Union” alongside the European Union received harsh condemnation from European countries. This polarizing rhetoric had the effect of creating a tangible fault line between East and West, cementing the theorized realities of Eurasianism. In effect, Putin set the stage for this dichotomy, as he could have just as easily continued the previous path of Western integration. Here, ideology and belief overpowered pragmatic policy choices.
Though this idealized Eurasian Union never came to fruition, there were many attempts to bring it about. Putin’s invasions of Georgia in 2008, as well as early incursions in Ukraine and Syria, can be seen as the result of his desire to solidify the borders of Eurasia into a single entity. The violence and philosophical battle with the West was arguably a poor decision from Russia, whose economy and people are linked to these nations. Yet, Putin’s belief in Russia’s historical geopolitical glory informed his mission, and it is through these lenses that Putin continues to describe his foreign policy choices.
In a deeper sense, many of these feelings are stemming from a historical animosity towards Western nations. Putin, in a 2021 interview, questioned whether post-1991 Russia “present[ed] any threat to the U.S. or European countries,” claiming that when the nation’s troops drew back to their borders, all that remained was “empty land.” Here, Putin makes two important points about his beliefs. First, is this idea of American/European betrayal. Russia is seen as noble and principled, attempting to hold up its end of a deal, only to be swindled in the long run. Secondly, Putin’s characterization of the unguarded Eastern lands as “empty” shows that he believes Russia is the natural occupier of these lands, especially in a military capacity. Much like Dugin, Putin has faith in the power of the land to decide geopolitical outcomes especially, and the occupation of Eastern lands has, historically, been undertaken by Russia.
The West is used to construct the geopolitical position of the East. Putin described Russia’s “desire for independence and sovereignty in spiritual, ideological and foreign policy spheres [as] an integral part of our national character.” This idea of national character is closely linked to Gumilev and other philosophers’ characterizations of culture as being innate and historical, ever-present across shifting global stages. Putin’s Orthodox fanaticism is linked directly to the first major Orthodox power: Byzantium. In a way, Byzantium can function as a great proxy for Russian ideologies. Byzantium’s historical conflicts with its neighbors tended to fall upon lines of faith and culture. Here, Orthodox civilization is the victim of a larger game by its Catholic neighbors. This idea of Orthodoxy as the underdog allows Putin to present this East versus West battle as not only historically grounded, but also inherently spiritual in nature. The West’s existence is necessary to construct the East in this worldview, allowing for the Eurasian dichotomies of civilizations to find both historical and modern footing.
The Borderlands
2012 saw the beginning of Putin’s third term as Russian President. This would prove to be a major turning point in Putin’s foreign policy. Most notably, he began to outwardly express ideals of imperialism and Eurasianism, infusing them with a distinct sort of spirituality. For example, Putin described Crimea as both “where our people live” and “of strategic importance for Russia as the spiritual source of the development of a multifaceted but solid Russian nation.” The first portion of this declaration is consistent with Putin’s historical beliefs. Yet, this concept of the “spiritual source” of Russia’s very existence links the Russian state of today with the historic origins of Slavic civilization. Putin, like other Eurasian philosophers, believes he has pinpointed one of the major sites of Russian civilizational development. Thus, to define and shape Russia, one must control Russia’s history, which extends to physically controlling the land. Indeed, it would only be two years after the start of Putin’s third term that Crimea would be illegally seized, demonstrating that Putin is unafraid to employ these ideological and dogmatic theories in the real world.
In 2021, Putin once again sought to employ history with the strategic aim of influencing the Russian population before launching another major geopolitical operation, this time the 2022 Invasion of Ukraine. However, Putin did not merely give another speech. Instead, he wrote a long-winded and passionate essay titled “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians,” which was released on the Kremlin’s website. As the title suggests, Putin seeks to craft a narrative demonstrating that Russians and Ukrainians are merely components of “a single whole.” The essay focuses on a common origin in the Kievan Rus, portraying Kyiv as the “mother of all Russian cities” and claiming that both nations are bound by language, economics, Orthodoxy, and a common historical monarchy. Once again, Putin draws upon this idea of a common historical lineage that has remained innate despite external geopolitical and technological shifts. This idea of the Kievan Rus functions much like the Mongol Empire in Gumilev’s posturing: an analogy to emphasize the uniqueness and intertwined history of Eurasian cultures. Putin then claims that this cultural center shifted to Moscow, where Russians conspired to “cast off the foreign yoke” and unify its people. This idea of Russian victimhood and suffering is deeply aligned with Passionarnost, suggesting that Russians and Ukrainians both are distinctly powerful as a result of their suffering. Further, Putin historically grounds his view of Russia as having a unique and special mission in the Eurasian world, as a unifying cultural force. Putin later erroneously correlates political fealty with ethnic unity when describing how the Cossacks joining forces with Russia meant that “the Cossacks referred to and defined themselves as Russian Orthodox people.” Much like Dugin, Putin sees ethnicity as a more fluid construct, relying more upon one’s loyalty to a state rather than a set of genetically or culturally defined values. Of particular note is that, in 2009, Dugin used the term “Novorossiya” to describe the Russian nation within Ukraine. Putin co-opts this term in his essay, describing the region as being “populated by people from all of the Russian provinces.” Putin ends the essay by playing upon civilizational dynamics, portraying Ukraine as not a separate cultural entity at all, but rather an “anti-Moscow Russia” and a buffer state between East and West.
The Imperial Consciousness
In most countries, ethnicity is generally regarded as either a dividing characteristic or a unifying one. Yet, in modern Russia, there exists a synthesis of imperialism and nationalism, aptly termed “imperial nationalism.” Putin’s ideological tendencies are emblematic of this imperial nationalism. Notably, Putin sought to fuse historical Russian literature into narratives of modern Russia, including both Tsarist and Soviet writings to bolster Eurasianism, Orthodox Christianity, and Narodnost (celebration of the Russian spirit). Tsarism is, obviously, an imperialist philosophy by its very nature. Yet, Dugin and many others all began to use “empire” to refer to both the Soviet past and a desired Russian future. Putin’s ability to reconcile this hardcore nationalism with deeply imperialist overtones may at first be a paradox, though examining the roots of this perceived dichotomy helps to resolve it.
Dugin believes that the “Russian people (i.e. Russia) never made its goal the creation of a mono-ethnic, racially uniform state” and have continually been “the bearers of a unique civilization.” Here, Dugin presents imperialism as a natural historical eventuality for Russia. Instead of embodying one end of the nationalist/imperialist dichotomy, Russia seeks to act as both a distinct cultural and ethnic force, itself having unique responsibilities, while also feeling impelled to incorporate people beyond their ethnic borders with whom they have perceived cultural affinities. More specifically, Russians tend to look for Narodnost and common religious practices in determining their cultural peers. For Putin, this historical lineage of seeking to construct a multi-ethnic Russia is central to the survival of the Russian state and identity, and he himself must then preserve this project as, in his view, he is the very embodiment of Russia. As Putin wrote in a 2012 article published in Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Russia has a mission “to unite, bind civilization,” which is directly necessary for the “preservation of the Russian cultural dominance.”
Putin is very careful to avoid using directly ethnic terms in these situations, largely as a strategic move to avoid fragmentation and polarization. Yet, this is also an extension of the Eurasianist belief in a more encompassing common heritage that transcends ethnic boundaries. Putin is able to substitute ethnicity with culture as a result of this interpretation of history. Such a move was important at this point in history, as the fall of the Soviet Union marked the first time Russians were forced to reconcile what Russia really meant, without a historically defined and distinct core population. Putin characterizes Muslim Russians, who comprise around 10% of modern Russia’s population, as “not hav[ing] any other fatherland” besides Russia. Russia, in Putin’s historical view, has naturally emerged as the common Eurasian heartland, being the origin of not merely a core ethnic Russian population, but also all other Eurasian cultural groups, comprising the ethnic boundaries of an idealized Eurasian empire.
Nationalism as Stability
One of Eurasianism’s greatest strengths is its ability to sow doubt in the current political orthodoxy. At least, in the eyes of Russian politicians, this is a virtue, as it demonstrates one's willingness to believe overt lies and misrepresentations in order to show their loyalty to the state. To Putin, the preservation of a strong state is of the utmost importance. The cultural memory of WW2, specifically the war’s instabilities and hardships, is hardwired in his mind, leading him to fear national weakness and prioritize strong resolve. He is an advocate for a vertikal vlasti, a direct line of power from the executive to lower branches of the government. His Millenium Manifesto, which acted as a guide for his early leadership, focused on the historical development of the Russian state in great detail. Specifically, darstvennichestvo (placing the state at the center of all things) and derzhavnost (a common belief in Russia’s great power destiny) both constitute two main values of Russia’s historical exceptionalism. Within this framework, the manifesto argues that universal rights and freedoms are foreign concepts to Russia, and the division of the Russian people almost always led to the collapse of Russia’s power. Here, tradition and historical precedent clearly justify his policy choices. If the country has always been powerful when the state was strong, we must keep the state strong enough to ensure the country is able to exert its force abroad.
Putin’s essay “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians” demonstrates his belief in this principle. For him, disunity has always been an externally motivated thing, caused by “forces that have always sought to undermine our unity.” He blames the “localization” policies of the Soviet Union for the “development and consolidation of the Ukrainian culture.” Whether or not his underlying logic is sound, Putin maintains that Western powers continually seek to disrupt the nationalistic affinities of Eurasian ethnic and cultural groups. Knowing Putin’s views on disunity, this is tantamount to the dismantling of the Russian state. His belief is that if politics do not reflect identity and culture, as in the Soviet era, an environment ripe for collapse and chaos is fostered.
Preventative Counter Revolution
Putin’s fears about domestic collapse only continued to heighten as his Presidency marched into the 2010s. As he saw democratic and egalitarian uprisings in neighboring countries like Ukraine, he began to strategize about how to avoid such instability at home. Putin used the pretense of Western meddling in neighboring political processes to pacify the domestic political landscape. Specifically, Putin’s fear of revolution, stemming from the internal threat posed by opposition leaders, youth protests, and other domestic dissent, inspired him to initiate a so-called “preventative counter revolution.” Yet, Putin needed a way to justify domestic insulation from the West to the Russian population.
The 2013 Maidan uprisings in Ukraine provided the perfect justification for Putin: a common enemy. Putin began to pull upon historical xenophobia and fears of Western encroachment to explain the inward societal turn, avoiding his own alternative deep-seated views about the historical necessity for a subservient population. In Putin’s own words, he feared that “if we embark on the path of permanent revolution ... we will submerge the entire post-Soviet space in a series of endless conflicts.”
By 2013, the Eurasian Youth Union had been long-established. Founded in 2005 by Alexander Dugin and others at the former residence of Ivan the Terrible, the group represented Kremlin-backed culture warriors who sought to prevent internal revolution. Not only did this founding directly link Putin’s domestic crackdown to a larger ideological movement, but it also cemented Putin’s faith in autocracy, with its fairly auspicious and significant founding location.
Orthodox Nationalism and Conservative Traditionalism
In 1999, Putin stated that Russia’s “institutions and structures, have always played an exceptionally important role in the life of the country, of the people… a strong state is not an anomaly, but… [the] motivating force for change.” One of the most important institutions, at least in Putin’s view of Russian history, has been the Orthodox church. The church even remained relatively strong through the Soviet period. At the height of WW2, Stalin faced a national crisis of identity and spirit. The resulting “National Bolshevism” campaign saw the inclusion of Russian history and ideas in propaganda. Not only did Stalin begin to invoke symbols of Russianness, but he also restored the patriarch and expanded the church. Even early Russian philosophers, like Dostoevsky and Solovyov, focused on their perception of the universal and all-encompassing nature of Russia. Solovyov, in specific, saw the justification for Russian exceptionalism in the universality of Orthodox Christianity, linking this to Russia’s unique geopolitical identity.
In Putin’s mind, Russia owes a great debt to the church for its work in centralizing Russian society. Dugin also feels that the church has played a major role in the creation of Eurasia, seeking to restore a sort of “spiritual aristocracy” reminiscent of the Byzantines. Portraying the church as essential to Russian statehood has allowed the Kremlin to form important partnerships with the church. Dugin himself had imagined a sort of “conservative revolution” in Russia, which centers traditional and heroic moral values. Putin has taken the idea of “dynamic conservatism,” a duality of traditional values with modernization (like Dugin’s ideal), embodied in a strong church/state partnership, and made it a reality.
For Putin, religious social norms are essential to ensuring subservience to the state. As Putin stated, having power “depend[s] on whether the citizens of a given country … identify with their own history, values and traditions, and whether they are united by common goals and responsibilities” The church is able to, and has historically, been the one to set these common goals and values. Thus, in partnering with the church, Putin is able to use the historical power and prestige of the institution to justify and reinforce his own mandate. Religious suppression in Russia has become fairly common, promoting solely the religious value of the Orthodox church. In 2010, a law was introduced that returned religious properties owned by the government back to the church. This was closely followed by the integration of religious education into Russian schools in 2012. Even more recently, Putin enacted laws banning propaganda showing “non-traditional sexual relations” to minors, as well as restricting profanity in the media. This return to traditional values is not only a link to a common past but also allows Putin to directly engineer the character of Russian culture.
As Putin’s ideology always relies upon the existence of a Western enemy, in the case of religion Putin views the West as an epicenter of moral and cultural degradation. His contrast of a righteous and pious Eurasian society with this West has allowed him to take up a sort of anti-Progressive mantle both domestically and abroad. Putin has created a number of organizations to uphold “traditional” religions and their values, as well as foster interfaith dialogue, such as the Commonwealth of Independent States. The Russkiy Mir Foundation, in the words of Patriarch Kiril, “is a community based on the Orthodox Faith and the Russian culture and language, as well as a common historical memory.” These organizations are not merely religious in nature. Rather, they seek to unify culture and society around common, Eurasian principles. This line of cultural engineering has informed Putin’s foreign policy. To quote Putin’s 2013 foreign policy doctrine, the “consolidation of the efforts of the international community requires… a common moral denominator.” Thus, Putin’s posturing as a beacon of historic nobility and traditional values allows him to deny the West’s ability to buy into a “common moral denominator.” In this sense, Putin has constructed Russian foreign policy as existing in a cultural sphere entirely separate from the West.
So What?
Putin’s uncanny ability to shape narratives and disguise authoritarian and selfish motives with ideological and historical language has provided him with the power to entirely reconstruct Russia around his own set of unique values. It is for these reasons that we must recognize that we’re no longer in a situation where the interests of Russia are the same as those of the Soviet Union. Western audiences must understand the new geopolitical playing field is not governed merely by short-term economic interests, but rather by larger and more civilizational trends, at least in the Russian view.